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Estimating the chances of economic recovery of the
Soviet Union

Gorbachev and His Reforms
Rett R. Ludwikowski

IN THE LAST year the Western press has
given a great deal of publicity to the new
attempts at economic reform in the Soviet
Union. “Gorbachev Sets Shift in Economy,” “Gorbachev’s Vigor Holds Attention
of Soviets,’’“Gorbachev Orders Wide ‘Restructuring’ of Soviet Economy”-these
are the titles of only a few articles which
examine Gorbachev’s “breath-taking determination to make changes in the
Soviet economy.’’’
The general optimism as to the chances
of Gorbachev’sreforms that accompanied
these comments was based on Gorbachev’s vigor, on the fact that he was the
youngest Soviet leader to attain the position of Secretary General of the Communist party of the Soviet Union since
Malenkov and recently was the youngest
of his competitors in the Soviet Politburo?
Gorbachev is also the first leader since
Lenin to have completed regular higher
education, and his dedication to the reform of the Soviet economy was proved in
the summer of 1981, when his lobby tried
to defend a radical reform of Soviet agriculture which was practically to exclude
some sectors of agriculture from the system of central planning? The reform was
never implemented because of the opposition of the conservative group in the
Politburo (supported by Brezhnev and
Prime Minister Tikhonov), but Gorbachev
made his mark as a reformer.
The more cautious commentators try
to remind us that Yuri Andropov in his fist

major policy address also freely acknowledged that the previous period had
not solved the Soviet bloc’s most urgent
problems and declared his determination
to fight against inefficiency in agriculture,
drunkenness, corruption, the black market, the general disintegration of the communist economy, and so forth. Some
others mentioned that Andropov’s predecessors had made the same declarations when first addressing the Central
Committee. As Martin Ebon, author of a
biography of Andropov, was able to show,
Andropov’s sharp criticism of the Communist bloc’s managerial deficiencies was
almost identical to remarks by G.M.
Malenkov thirty years before:
In 1982 the optimistic Western assessment of the “new era of Soviet reforms”
stemmed from tales about Andropov’s
preddections for jazz, whisky, and Western
novels. Now it is based on the fact that
Gorbachev is “a man of a new generation,”
on his expertise in agriculture, and on
reports of his visit to Great Britain, where
he was portrayed as “a civilized diplomat”
with a sense of humor, “bright and technically able to absorb new concepts of
The American
government and scien~e.”~
public can inquire with good reason: Why,
despite these repeated optimistic prognoses, has nothing changed substantially
in the Soviet economy since Krushchev?
True, the system did not collapse, but also,
until recently, it did not show any symptoms of a quick economic recovery. The
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succession to the younger generation may
result in attempts to introduce a new
epoch of modest reformist transformations. It is even very likely that economic stagnation will compel Corbachev
to at least resume attempts at modification of the Soviet economy. Yet the success of the reforms is a function of a variable that is the sum total of many elements-social, ideological, economic, political. The personal characteristics of the
Soviet leaders and their awareness of the
deficiencies of the system are only one of
the elements. As far as a substantive
reconstruction, not a marginal modification, is concerned, the economically counterproductive elements of the system are
more significant. They have worked and
most probably will continue to work
against any attempt at reform. They are
worth careful examination.
What Happened to the Communist
Tollectiue Mentality”?
THE CONSTITUTION OF the Soviet Union Says
that state property-the principal form of
socialist property-is subject to common
ownership by the Soviet people (Article
11). Soviet citizens are obliged to preserve
and protect socialist property (Article 61).
According to Marxism-Leninism, respect
for collective values was supposed to
followthe growing unity of individual and
society. Socialist doctrine promoted the
ideas of ultimate equality, freedom, and
justice, and offered a belief that these
goals could be accomplished only by a
total reconciliation between individual
and social interest. Awareness of the superiority of shared interest to that of individual interest was supposed to create a
so-called collective mentality-a precondition for the further evolution of society
toward communism. On behalf of the
collective interest, not only all means of
production and distribution, but also social, moral, and even religious convictions
were to be subject to public control. The
individual’s rights and duties were to be
determined by society.
The attempt to create a “collective
mentality” turned out to be a total failure.

The concept, which in a way typified the
Old Bolsheviks, fell victim to corrosion in
the decades of Stalin’s rule. The fact that
millions of people were encouraged and
even forced to survive at the cost of
others’ lives could not but drastically affect public morality. The role of a collective in the formation of a socialist personality was decidedly crippled. In fact,
party propaganda notwithstanding, the
collective in any true sense posed a threat
to totalitarian control. The real aim of the
collective as it developed under Stalin was
not to bring people together, but to serve
as an instrument for the annihilation of the
individual approach to life and to promote
the complete atomization of society. Artificial communities created by the state
were to destroy all genuine intermediate
social structures. The destruction of all
trust in mutual relations between people,
the disintegration of family loyalty, and the
denunciation of parents by their children
were intended to weaken the distinction
between truth and falsehood and to deprive individuals of the capacity to form
their own opinions. Religious beliefs were
proclaimed to be in clear contradiction to
the materialistic philosophy of communism. The moral impact of the Church
was blocked, but was never replaced by
any kind of Communist morality. Socialist
collectives, which had been expected to
replace the Church’s authority, never
gained broad public respect.
The Bolshevization of society resulted
in its cultural and moral impoverishment,
in the leveling of all groups to the lowest
common denominator. “Social justice,”
comprehended in this way, led in practice
to the total subordination of private interests to some projection of “public
good,” which was usually offered by a
relatively small group of social leaders,
who only pretended to speak on behalf of
society as a whole. The total unity between individual and society appeared to
be nothing but a total destruction of human individuality. When we discuss the
difficulties of the Soviet economy and the
prospects of economic reform, all of these
factors must be taken into consideration.
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Ideological and Moral Background
of the Economic Crisis
THEDECAY OF Communist ideology is undoubtedly a leitmotif in all debates over
the crisis in the Soviet political system.
Numerous commentators on Soviet domestic problems like to emphasize the
total decomposition of Marxism-Leninism
in the Soviet bloc. They argue that in
today’s Soviet bloc nobody takes ideological clichCs seriously. Party leaders are
cynical and the public hates communism.
As Vladimir Bukovsky has written, “From
top to bottom, no one believes in Marxist
dogma anymore, even though they continue to measure their actions by it, refer
to it, and use it as a stick to beat one
another with: it is both a proof of their
loyalty and a meal ticket.”6
Some distinguished writers like Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn hold that MarxismLeninism is a dead ideology in the sense
that “even during its best decades it was
totally mistaken in its predictions and was
never a science.” This completely false
and harmful ideology is followed blindly
by Soviet leaders, however. Their adherence to the precepts of MarxismLeninism is a principal source of the numerous failures and blunders of the Soviet
regime. “The spiritual renaissance of our
country,”argues Solzhenitsyn,“lies in our
liberation from this deadening, killing
ide~logy.”~
Other writers, among whom Leszek
Kolakowski is a prominent example,
believe ideology is used in the Soviet bloc
primarily as an instrument for legitimizing
the power system. Kolakowski writes,
“The socialist class of exploiters is not
eager to retain and extend its power because it professes a false doctrine (after
all, throughout history despots did quite
well without Marxism); rather, they adhere to this doctrine as a tool to retain and
extend their power.”s
It is worth noting that discussion of the
significance of Communist ideology usually concentrates on the most recent
symptoms of ideological crisis, while seldom if ever considering the economic and

moral repercussions of ideological decay.
This leaves an impression that the collapse of Communist ideology is a relatively
recent occurrence. In fact, the role played
by Marxism-Leninism has undergone visible transformations throughout the duration of Communist rule in Russia, and the
ideological crisis has had much more extensive consequences than is usually
recognized.
The Old Bolsheviks were masters of
revolutionary techniques, but they had no
experience in running a state. They knew
how to subvert, destroy, and change; but
they had little knowledge of how to build,
create, or introduce more advanced institutions, better economic techniques, or
improved agricultural methods. For them
Marxism served as a sort of sacred guide
to be followed almost blindly. But experience usually is a better teacher than
theories are. The tenets of “genuine Marxism” often proved inapplicable in postrevolutionary Russia. Soon it appeared
that the Bolshevik party, despite its adherence to Marxism, did not practice its
basic assumptions. On the one hand, the
Bolsheviks had to pervert Marx’s theory
for their own purposes; on the other, they
were not able to create a new theory. The
solution hit upon was to appear to adhere
to the basic dogmas of Marxism, while imposing strictly controlled thought. The
bigger their pragmatic deviations, the
stronger they pretended to be the most
orthodox followers of “scientific socialism.” Marxism, or rather Marxism-Leninism (which means Lenin’s Marxism), has
never become a dead ideology. It played
and still plays a significant role.
The theory of Marxism-Leninism is sufficiently flexible to provide general principles which can be adopted by the regime
and exploited as its stable theoretical
background. At the same time, no doctrinal tenets are sacrosanct under Soviet
policy except insofar as they are useful to
the ruling elite. As Daniel Bell has correctly pointed out, in the Soviet system “no
single element of doctrine is a keystone
whose removal would cause the collapse
of Soviet ide~logy.”~
The regime armed
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with totalitarian machinery does not need
a precise guide to its actions. What it does
require is general confirmation that the
leaders are moving in the right direction; it
needs a theoretical justification, and
Marxism-Leninism is able to provide this
disguise.
Does this mean that ideology no longer
causes Soviet leaders to act? In a literal
sense, the answer is yes. This does not
mean, however, that the role played by
ideology is meaningless. Marxism-Leninism long ago ceased to serve as the main
guide to action, but it did not disappear.
Though pragmatic Soviet leaders do not
follow Marx’s recommendations literally,
Communist rulers are forced to decorate
their decisions and speeches with Marxian
rhetoric. And this everyday contact with
Marxist cliches and slogans has an inevitable impact on their mentality. After all,
adherence to Marxism-Leninism can be a
source of difficulty, but it can also be very
convenient. When at a loss for a solution
to a policy question, party leaders can
open the “sacred books” and find some
“phrase” which, in the future, can justify
even the most stupid decision. Obviously,
in such a situation, mechanical application
of Marxism can only exacerbate the consequences of a former inept policy, but the
ideological facade is a useful weapon until
a stronger contestant is able to pin a
“revisionist” label on such an interpretation. Viewed from the perspective of a
Soviet leader, then, ideology can serve as
a means of legitimization and delegitimization of political, economic, and social
decisions-an excellent weapon in political and internal struggles, a justification of
any international strategy. And, after all, it
provides a stable theoretical background
for the system.
Ideology has also played an important
social role. Its unifymg function-its role
as a sort of “social cement”-has often
been pointed out by Western political
thinkers.I0Ideology helped the ruling elite
to maximize its control over the thinking
and actions of individuals. It was a priceless method to mobilize public energy, an
excellent instrument of political manipula-

tion, an important means of shaping a
political culture of the society. Indoctrination was an effective form of political
socialization which involved individuals in
the political system.
Ideological manipulation, once its efficacy was discovered, was continually exploited to totally invade the peoples’
minds. The state-controlled press and
broadcasting system were transformed
into one big “machinery of the lie.” Political education reached all groups in society. Special political schools, universities
of Marxism-Leninism, study circles in the
army,and special committees of political
enlightenment in factories and in “houses
of culture” were bound to create a “new
communist individual” totally subservient
to the party.”
Despite all these precautions, it did not
prove true that “lies continuously repeated sound like truth.” The common
sense of the public has never been totally
destroyed by party indoctrination. True,
some people began to accept ideology
without question. The permanent repeating of the same ideological lessons “totally
stripped them of critical tho~ght.”’~
Others, however, ceased to react at all to
ideological stimuli. The effectiveness of
ideological manipulation has weakened
considerably in the last forty years. The
repeated Soviet “counterrevolutions” and
“periods of deviations”-the successive
disclosures of the fallacies in the regimehad gradually destroyed the “magic” of
Marxism-Leninism.
This growing ideological crisis has been
most strongly felt in the middle ranks of
society in the Soviet bloc. This “center” of
the social structure of a Communist society consists of three important groups.
The fist-consisting of those who live in
so-called internal emigration-includes
those who are almost totally indifferent to
political issues, neither believing in ideological cliches nor willing to fight against
them. They do not accept the regime, but
their main concern is merely “to be left
alone.” The second group, the passive observers, brings together skeptics and opportunists, who do not refuse participa-
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tion in the regime but try to minimize it.
Though not believing in the Communist
ideology, they are ready to follow cynically those who offer the biggest benefits
and to pay lip service to those ideological
clichCs which are most profitable at the
moment. The third group-and the one
which is most important for Communist
leaders-consists of the “active participants,” who really believe in the regime’s ideological goals and are wholeheartedly engaged in the creation of “a
Soviet World Republic.” This group provides the party with members who are
ready not only to make party careers, but
also to fight for the future of communism.
The continuous dwindling of this group,
which in certain Communist-ruled countries has almost ceased to exist, is the
most spectacular effect of the crisis of
Communist ideology.
The window-dressing character of
Marxism-Leninism has had important social, moral, and economic repercussions,
however, which were scarcely noticed at
the time either by Communist rulers or
Western commentators. The fact that
ideological criteria were losing credibility
as the standard of social behavior inevitably led to the creation of a double
standard of public morality. Under pressure from the regime, the public had to
observe ideological tenets although they
could not be forced to respect them.
Books without substance, even if they are
useful decorations, are not taken seriously.
Ideology served for a while to hamper
the process of moral corrosion in socialist
societies. Communism itself is a sort of
religion. The blind belief in MarxistLeninist dogmas deprived society of the
capability to think independently; but
ideology did serve, on the other hand, to
provide a sort of “quasi-moral” dogma
which reduced the pure cynicism of individual attitudes. As ideological values
began to lose their authority, however,
this resulted in a further drastic decline in
public morality. The awareness of ideological decay corrupted a generation of
party members. They came to understand

that, in fact, coercion is useful not to protect ideological values but to protect their
own privileges-privileges which are obtainable by simple loyalty to the party elite
and which, in any other circumstances,
would not be tolerated by society. The
lack of ideological illusions helped create
what Lenin called “conventional hypocrisy.” The devaluation of ideology has had
an equally demoralizing effect on the rest
of society. Workers began to realize that a
double standard of morality means one
morality for the party elite and another for
nonparty people and even for ordinary
party members. They realized that corruption had become institutionalized by
the system-so much so that it had become the unofficial method of distributing
goods which were scarcely available on
the open market.
This realization has become a major
detriment to the system of public property: the central characteristic of communism. The ordinary citizen argues that
if state doctrine is only a facade, then
public property-sanctified by the ideology-actually belongs to no one. Hence
the “seizure” of public property has nothing to do with theft. It is prohibited by law
but not stamped by public morality. Or
rather, to be more precise, there are two
public moralities, official and private. If an
act of “seizure” of public property is officially revealed, an individual will be publicly condemned otherwise,even if the act
is broadly known, he will not meet public
ostracism but, in many instances, understanding and assistance. In the double
standard of public morality, the rule of
“live and let live” has become sacrosanct.
For decades party leaders believed that
the state derived many benefits from this
rule, which was commonly known and accepted by the authorities.According to an
unofficial party interpretation, it made
sense to tolerate a moderate level of corruption. Among its advantages from the
state’s point of view was the fact that the
public seemed more intimidated,more dependent on the authorities, more controllable. Under such a system, those who
steal can be condemned at any time. If
Spring I986
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public opinion accepts that everyone
steals if he wants to live, it will accept the
fact that everyone can be punished if the
state so desires. The individual must live
with the impression that the state’s tolerance can cease at any time.
This does not mean that the Communist
party consciously created the system of
“double morality.’’ The party simply accepted it and tried to derive from it as
many benefits as possible. Every coin has
two sides, however. With time the advantages of such a strategy seemed less and
less clear-cut. The collapse of public
morality contributed explicitly to all of the
distresses of the Soviet economy mentioned above: low labor discipline, neglect
of equipment, absenteeism, bribery, unproductive work, total lack of interest in
quality output, and so forth. Society
created new unofficial techniques of social
compensation for the unfairness of communism, methods of competition for
benefits available only in backstage struggles, means of circumventing the pretended social equality. The system created not
only a black market and other corruption,
but also unofficial channels through which
decisions of all kinds are made. A “double
morality,” in fact, is linked with the “double life” of the whole society.
As Arnold Beichman and Mikhail S.
Bernstein have pointed out, “The ‘second
economy,’or the ‘gray-black’economy, is
what makes the Soviet state function. The
‘second economy’ is what makes life bearable for everybody.The consumer can obtain various kinds of food, goods, and services otherwise unobtainable in official
shops. The people who provide these
foods, goods, and services profit and can
in turn better their life through the ‘second
economy.’ The ‘second economy’ system
is what provides the incentives for people
to produce. To weaken these incentives by
a drive against ‘corruption’will decrease
what productivity exists n0w.”13 Lowerlevel party leaders watch carefully for
every possibility of grasping privileges
which they still do not possess. Backstage
mechanisms, corruptive techniques, unofficial strategies-all are part of their

repertoire. Thanks to the lack of democratic control, such techniques are inherent in the Bolshevik system of power,
which protects all its fossilized components. The Soviet “vicious circle” is also
closed around the sphere of public
morality.

The ‘Dictatorship of Ignoramuses”
A QUEsTlON WHICH is Often put to newcomers from the Eastern bloc concerns
the competence of the nomenklatura people, who occupy hundreds of thousands of
important posts in science, education,
Is it really true
agriculture, and ind~stry.’~
that their ineptitude results in incalculable
losses for the Communist economy? Are
they really so incompetent and their decisions so foolish? Before we delve deeper
into this problem, some explanation of the
transformation the system of party bureaucracy has undergone in the postStalinist period will be required.
The death of Stalin began a new era for
the regime. It was obvious that the system
created by Stalin had been consolidated
and that the absence of its creator did not
jeopardize its basic tenets. The crucial
principle of one-party rule, which in fact
meant the power of a small elite headed
by a single leader, was left untouched. Yet
the system required some modification. In
Stalin’s time, even the top-ranking members of the party elite felt extremely insecure. This inevitably reduced the appeal
of a party career. The younger generation
of party leaders was much more pragmatic, much less dedicated to revolutionary ideas. They wanted to enjoy their
“share in power” without the risks that
had accompanied their predecessors’
endeavors.
At the same time, the system of “supplementation” of the acting party elite required some improvement. Krushchev’s
generation understood perfectly Vilfredo
Pareto’s theory of the “circulation of
elites.” The rule of the party elite, “the
guiding force of the proletariat,”was taken
for granted as well as the truth that elites
ruled in all societies. Yet their success
depended upon their degree of flexibility.
125
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Only “open” elites, which were ready to
co-opt the most flexible social elements,
were able to survive. Based on this premise, the Communist party concluded that it
had to involve more groups in its politics
by giving them the impression that they
might be able to participate in the decision-makingprocess. The only qualification for co-optation into higher ranks was
to be acceptance of the politics of those
currently running the party and skill in
presenting ideological cliches.
In looking for recruits, party leaders obviously sought people from whom both
loyalty and expertise could be expected.
Unfortunately, the combination of both
characteristics in the same people was
hard to find. In fact, a system based on arbitrary decisions frequently changed by
the party leaders could not really welcome experts. On the contrary, professional skills and values were incompatible with the principle of partiinost, which
declared that the party was always right.
The system led to the method of “negative
selection,” which promoted only compliant, conformable yes men. Individuals
who combined this trait with a particular
ruthlessness had the best prospects for
party careers. In fact, nomenklatura did
not require traditional education, but
rather these “talents” of a special type.
Party officers and managers were not
selected on the basis of professional or
even bureaucratic ability. Professionals
who could think independently and criticize openly were disqualified as candidates for nomenklatura positions. To the
party elite, reliability was far more important.
To perform routine activities throughout the country, the regime had to replace
Stalinist terror with a more effective system of rewards and motivations. As a
result, unaccountabdity, tolerance for irresponsibility, incompetence, and corruption became the price paid in exchange for
loyalty of the nomenklatura to the party
elite. As long as a person on the list did not
act against the party elite, he usually could
expect to remain in one nornenkliltura
position or another, regardless of his fit-

ness for the job. Anyone who demonstrated extreme stupidity or incompetence was simply transferred to another
post, thereby developing the impression
that, in exchange for his loyalty, he would
gain security and the protection of the
system.
The party elite consisted of persons
who, though they competed among themselves, were capable of mutually supporting one another against threats from outside the party system which could
jeopardize their careers. Thanks to these
arrangements, the system was relatively
fluid and able to survive the long period of
totalitarian rule. The multitudinous nomenklatura allowed the Communist party
to involve a sizable group of adaptable
people in its affairs. To be on the nomenklatura list meant having a better-paying
job, a better apartment and a car, better
and quicker prospects for promotion to a
higher bureaucratic office, an impression
of protection and immunity, and participation in the decision-making process. In
return, one had only to follow the party
line. To oppose this line meant being deprived of everything;it meant having one’s
career ended instantly.
The successful climb to the top of the
party pyramid instills in the mind of an apparatchik, or party technocrat, the conviction that ruling others is his own personal right. He begins to treat a Communist enterprise, factory, educational center, or hospital as his own possession. A
member of the nomenklatura experiences
an emperor-like power in his territory. He
begins to reward friends and relatives,
punish enemies, and modify decisions in
return for bribes. The process of climbing
to the top seems itself to legitimize his
conduct.
In a closed society that does not tolerate any open criticism, professionals will
always pose a threat to the secure position of the leaders. Incompetent party
leaders personally not only interfere in
detailed economic problems, but also apparently even feel an obligation to do so.
Every step in their political careers
teaches them that the party is infallible
Spring 1986
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and that they share infallibility of a sort
with the entire organization.The party and
its vanguard cannot err. This system does
not need and cannot endure experts who
could reveal the mistakes of the ruling
elite. Mistakes are not possible because “a
defeat” is something alien to communism.
That reasoning closes this “viciouscircle”;
if the party and its leaders cannot be
wrong, then every economic failure of the
acting leadership must be presented as a
victory. Except during periods of succession crisis, when predecessors can be
criticized,the leadership shows a total inability to break out of this economic and
political deadlock. The “dictatorship of ignoramuses” (as it was called by Stefan
Kisielewski) is a permanent component of
the Soviet system.

What Handicaps the
Decision-Making Process?
EVERY STUDENT OF bureaucratic structures
knows well that no decision-makingprocess can prove effective without at least
several basic elements: competence, information, coordination, responsibility of
policy-makers, control over the implementation of decisions, and capability to
learn from mistakes. In the preceding examination, the first item on this brief list
was found sadly lacking. It must be said,
besides, that the Soviet system is equally
deficient in the rest of the necessary
elements.
A study of how policy choices are made
in the Soviet bloc finds that central planning, the policy-making process, and the
implementation of crucial decisions are
profoundly affected by the permanent
lack of proper information. All bureaucratic organizations are built to act on
rational premises. It is true that decisionmaking always involves some nonrational
components when decisions take place
under uncertainty and when the consequences of the choices are unknown. But
the problem that handicaps the socialist
economy is not simply the presence of
nonrational factors in the decision-making
process, but rather the overwhelming degree to which such nonrational deter-

minants contribute to the final decision.
Because of the predominance of nonrational factors, important choices are
made without proper calculation,and wild
predictions take the place of rational costbenefit analysis. In the socialist system,
which not only lacks proper information
but is actually based on misinformation,
the odds of increasing the role of rational
factors in planning and decision-making
are quite small. Without proper information, socialist decision-making processes
will never fit the rational model.
Why is adequate information unavailable in Soviet economic management? It
has often been emphasized by Western
analysts that misinformation is a significant strategy in Soviet foreign policy and
that propaganda and censorship help to
manipulate political attitudes in the Soviet
bloc.15 To exist, the system has to be protected from real information. Only selected information without alternatives can
be approved. Information shapes the
political culture of society, and Communist leaders cannot afford to relinquish
the dissemination of information which
serves as a convenient instrument of
power. While misinformation was seen as
the means of subjugating society and
manipulating public attitudes, it was presumed that the party elite, which had at its
disposal a widespread system of police
control, was itself perfectly informed
about the true state of things. The numerous party cadres subordinated to top
party leaders were supposed to help
maintain military control over the country, monopoly control of all means of
communication and education, and complete state control over the economy;
they were also responsible for providing
perfect information to their superiors.This
is a complete misunderstanding of the real
situation in socialist countries. The system
which successfully keeps individuals totally obedient and almost completely deprived of all forms of privacy is entirely
lacking any effective means of economic
information or control.
In fact, the large number of overlapping
intermediary organizations badly hampers
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the decision-making process. Functionaries of all ranks are equally interested in
“success” and ready to misinform the central authorities. The hierarchical pyramid
of control simply does not work. If the
party cannot be wrong, then “success”
must accompany all Communist economic endeavours. This accounts for the fact
that the party is totally incapable of learning from its mistakes. The constant push
for economic success leads to the “overfulfillment”of all plans and the inclination
to “maximize” output without regard for
quality. It leads managers who are rewarded only for “successes” to conceal the real
inefficiency of their enterprises. In a system in which production of predetermined
quantities is the essential indicator of success, there are weak incentives to strive
for more efficient production or reduction
of expenditures.
Misinformation is implicit in the organizational inadequacies of the Communist
system. Some managers fake the accounts; others artificially exaggerate the
quantity of production. In Polish coal
mines, Solidarity revealed the existence of
special machines that were imported to
mix rock and soil with coal to double the
apparent output. And, what is more paradoxical, the central authorities prefer not
to be well-informed. A friend of mine
working on statistics at the police criminal
officeonce explained to me how reports
on criminal activity were put together. His
task was to “improve” the data received
from each police station to show a lower
level of crime. “The Ministry of Internal Affairs,” he explained, “would then review
the composite report and most probably
send it back for ‘proofreading’-a euphemism for a downward revision of the
figures. It is the routine procedure, repeated in each reporting period, regardless of the originally quoted figures.” It is
obvious that in this situation, providing the
correct information would certainly
amount to self-denunciation.
Inadequate information and deliberately distorted statistics handicap all economic planning and cripple all coordination. Harmonious functioning of the eco-

nomic sections for more effective results
cannot properly be established, if for no
other reason than the shortages of material of which production has been exaggerated in statistics. This causes supply
dislocation and competition for resources
between enterprises which, theoretically,
should not exist in socialist industry.
Further contribution to the lack of accurate statistics and empirical data comes
from the partiinost mentality of the Central Offices for Control of Press, Publication, and Performances. Their official
Books of Directives and Recommendations set forth detailed instructions for
the elimination of any negative comments
on party decisions or any reference to official blunders or bungling. This obviously
makes any serious discussion of economic
fallacies impossible. Under such broad
censorship, basic economic, social, and
political information goes unpublished.
Costly scandals and blunders in urban
planning, housing, and agriculture; irrational decisions and investments; location
and production facts are withheld from
the public. All scientific disciplines which
are based on statistics are hampered by
such politics.I6 Reliance on similar misinformation, economic naivete unsupported
by genuine economic research, and the
arbitrariness of decisions made by central
authorities go a long way toward explaining the economic weakness of all Communist countries.
Reformation proposals usually focus on
a program of decentralization of the managerial system and emphasize the need for
creating a system basing incentives on
profit, increasing efficiency and discipline,
giving greater responsibility to local managers, et cetera. Each new party “team” has
repeated that the decentralization of
decision-making could begin the real recovery of the Communist system. Each
has soon realized, however, that decentralization is incompatible with the political aspirations of the Communist leadership. On one hand, it is obvious that, given
the lack of proper information at the top,
local managers are better equipped to
deal with economic reality. On the other
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hand, short of returning to a system of
market stimulants, the system of central
control could be replaced only by the supervision of local workers’ committees.
But this solution could endanger party
dominance. Economic power, once shifted
to the working class, would lead to the
growth of political power for the masses.
Communist theory assumes that political
and economic resources of power are inseparable. The totalitarian system cannot
be transformed into one that is merely authoritarian without posing a real threat to
the ruling elite. Rank-and-file bureaucrats
at the center are afraid of losing power,
and their influence and even their jobs
might be threatened. For this reason, attempts at decentralization have been uniformly superficial. In their final effect, such
“reforms” have brought about only the
further extension of bureaucracy and the
creation of new intermediate bureaucratic
structures which serve merely to convey
the real decision made by functionaries at
the center. Nor is this surprising, since
both central and regional administrators
want power, not responsibility.The center
does not want to lose the appearance of
economic control; the local agencies want
to share power while bearing no responsibility for economic results. Barring fundamental changes in the system, therefore, it would be naive to expect that
administrators will voluntarily accept
more responsibility than absolutely necessary. People are not angels. It is difficult
enough (and Communists disregard this
totally) for them to be human beings.

TO RECAPITULATE M y analysis, I do not expect a recovery of the socialist economy
for the following reasons:
(1) The system has forever destroyed
the so-called collective mentality, which
was supposed to be a basic component of
Communist political culture.
(2) The crisis of Communist ideology is
irreversible. The belief of the masses in
Marxism-Leninismcannot be reconstructed, yet socialist leaders will not give up obsolete dogmas because they do not know
how to function without them.

(3) The ideological crisis has undermined the rudiments of Communist morality and corroded all Marxist-Leninist
values, including the key dogma of common ownership.
(4) The moral and ideological crisis has
killed all healthy incentives among workers and managers.
(5) Without the rudiments of democracy people can be forced to work, but not
to work efficiently. They will operate pursuant to the principle: “Those at the top
pretend to share power with us; we pretend to work.” On the other hand, democratic transformations are too dangerous
for the ruling elite, They are simply incompatible with the totalitarian framework of
the system.
(6) The double standard of morality,
together with massive- economic dislocations, has created a black market and
other corruption, which have been tolerated for so long that they are now irrevocably integrated in the way of life in
Communist countries.
(7) The need for creating a relatively
open party elite forced the party to build a
system of “negative selection” that promotes compliant, conformable yes men,
who care far more about their careers
than about the system of Communist
values.
(8) Lack of competence, widespread
corruption, and unaccountability of decision-makers are incompatible with the
basic principles of economic efficiency.
(9) Lack of information, coordination,
and proper control over the implementation of productive decisions, coupled with
a form of decentralization that is more apparent than real, cripple the socialist system of central planning and decisionmaking.
(10) Without the party bureaucracy
and nomenklatura people, the party cannot function; but with them, no reform is
possible. Both are key ingredients of a system which can be crushed but not reformed. They are an inseparable part of
the system.
In 1982 some Western scholars referred
to Andropov’s plan of reform as “the task
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of Hercules in cleaning the Augean
stables.”17To the extent the “task” refers
to real reform and not a tiny “cleaning,”
the attempts of Corbachev will more
nearly resemble the Sisyphean Labors.
The system itself has suppressed economic vitality and spontaneity, protected
its own incurability, and locked its leaders
in the “vicious circle” created by their pre-

decessors. If I am asked whether this “vicious circle’’ will compel the Soviet leaders to return to the negotiation table (after
Reykjavik talks) my answer is affirmative.
If the question refers to the chances for
economic recovery of the Soviet system,
the answer follows the old Roman formula: Quod natura negat, reddere nemo
potest.

)The Washington Post, March 12, June 4, 12, 16, 17,
and 21, 1985.2Lenin when he reached this position
was 47, Stalin 50, Malenkov 51, Krushchev 59, Brezhnev 58, Andropov 68, Chernenko 71. 3See Arnold
Beichman and Mikhail S. Bernstam, Andropov: New
Challenge to the West (New York, 1983), pp. 198-208.
4Martin b n , The Andropov File (New York, 1983),
p. 132. SThe Washington Post? March 12, 1985.
GQuoted in Donald D. Barry and Carol Barner-Barry,
Contemporary Souiet Politics: An Introduction (Englewood Cliffs, NJ., 1982), p. 37. 7Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Warning to the West (New York, 1976), p. 114.
SLeszek Kolakowski, “Ideologyin Eastern Europe,” in
East Central Europe: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow,
ed. Milorad Drachkovitch (Stanford, Calif., 1982), p.
45.gDaniel Bell, “The End of Ideology in the Soviet
Union,” in Marxist Ideology in the Contemporary
World-Its Appeals and Paradoxes, ed. Milorad
Drachkovitch (Stanford, Calif., 1966), p. 107. IKornpare the views of Joseph M. Bochensld and Daniel
Bell, Marxist Ideologry in the Contemporary World,
pp. 60-120. IISee Robert Conquest,Politics ofldeas in
the USSR (London, 1967), pp. 97-117. IzCompare the
examination of k Zinoviewv‘s points on thii matter in
Kolakowsld, “Ideology in Eastern Europe,” p. 44.
Weichman and Bernstam, Andropou, p. 202. 14The

system of nomenklatura was established during 1946
and 1947, and it consisted originally of about 40,000
newly promoted officials and newly approved old apparatchiks. In the 1950s this network was substantially extended. See Beichman and Bernstam, Andropov, p. 103. %ee Richard H. Schultz and Roy
Godson, Dezinformatsia, Active Measures in Soviet
official book of
Strategy (Washington, 1984).
censorship reads like a historical novel. Here are a
few examples from one of them: “Figures illustrating
the state and growth of alcoholism on a national
scale are not to appear in the mass media.”“All information about the direct threat of industry and the
use of chemicals in agriculture to human life and
health must be expunged.” “Informationconcerning
Poland‘s purchase of licenses from capitalist countries is to be eliminated from the mass media.” “All
publicationspresenting general statistics with regard
to conditions of safety and hygiene at work or to occupational diseases must be withheld.” “Absolutely
no information is to be published concerning the
Katowice mine disaster in which four miners lost
their lives.” Official Censorshipin the Polish People’s
Republic (Ann Arbor, 1978), p. 4. l7Ebon, The Andropov File, pp. 128-29.
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